About this journal
Advances in Cognitive Psychology (ACP) is an open access, peer-reviewed scientific journal covering all areas and aspects of human cognitive psychology, including, but not limited to, perception, attention, memory, social cognition, and language processing in behavioral, cognitive, psychophysiological, and neuropsychological perspectives, as well as in computer- and modeling-based science. We welcome original empirical and theoretical articles, as well as replications, reports of null findings, and literature reviews. ACP also promotes and encourages open science, pre-registration of study and is a peer community in registered reports (PCI RR) - friendly journal. We are also indexed in a range of major databases, including PubMed, Scopus, JCR, and PsycINFO.
Advances in Cognitive Psychology is co-financed by the Ministry of Education and Science (Ministerstwo Edukacji i Nauki) under the program "Rozwój czasopism naukowych," RCN/SN/0494/2021/1.
Issue 1 Online: 31 March 2023
Editorial Letter: Completing the Vision and Finding New Challenges
Charles-Étienne Benoit, Piotr Kałowski, Konrad Janowski
2022 has been prolific, leading us into 2023 which will be a turning point for ACP and our Editorial Team. However, we first wish to express once more and with the utmost sincerity our gratitude to our Editorial Board, Authors, and Reviewers. It is moving to see the generosity, insight and commitment of scientists worldwide to the idea of quality and open science.
The Two-Factor Structure of Cognitive Flexibility: Tempo of Switching and Overcoming of Prepotent Responses
Aleksandra Różańska, Weronika Król, Jarosław Orzechowski, Aleksandra Gruszka

Aleksandra Różańska, Jagiellonian University, Institute of Psychology, Romana Ingardena 6, 30-060 Kraków, Poland.
Email: aleksandra.rozanska@doctoral.uj.edu.pl
The current study aimed to uncover the structure of common latent processes underlying the execution of several tasks that hypothetically measure spontaneous and adaptive cognitive flexibility, providing evidence for their convergent validity. A group of healthy volunteers (N = 121) completed two sets of tasks to assess spontaneous and adaptive cognitive flexibility. Spontaneous flexibility measures included a divergent thinking test (to assess fluency and flexibility of thinking) and a verbal fluency test. Adaptive flexibility measures involved a set-switching test as a measure of switch costs and an attentional set-shifting test as a measure of learned irrelevance and perseveration). A vocabulary knowledge test provided a proxy measure of crystallized intelligence. Hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward's method revealed the existence of two separate subgroups of variables. The first group comprised fluency and flexibility of thinking, crystallized intelligence, verbal fluency, and switch costs. The second group included attentional shift variables, that is, learned irrelevance and perseveration. We consider these results meaningful and indicative of two separate factors contributing to cognitive flexibility: (a) speed of switching and (b) overcoming of prepotent responses. We discuss the implications of our results for the assessment of cognitive flexibility.
Keywords: spontaneous cognitive, flexibility, adaptive cognitive flexibility, divergent thinking; taskswitching, attentional set-shiftingRomantic Relationships and the Actions (or Inactions) That End Them: Blaming Self or Other Influences Feelings of Regret
Todd McElroy, Joanna Salapska-Gelleri

Todd McElroy, Department of Psychology, Florida Gulf Coast University.
Email: tmcelroy@fgcu.edu
Romantic relationships can greatly enhance our lives, creating intimacy and bonding. Yet, not all relationships succeed, and when they fail, the resulting feelings can be intense, often leaving us feeling regret. The regret we feel is determined in part by whether we decide to take action or rely on inaction. Research shows that actions typically elicit more regret than inactions. However, research also shows gender differences for romantic regret, with men sometimes reporting more regret over inactions and women more regret over actions or equal regret for actions and inactions. The decision justification theory posits that regret is driven by two components: the event’s outcome and self-blame. In the current investigation, we manipulated self and other blame in a hypothetical romantic situation and showed that when blame is attributable to one’s self, actions (e.g., breaking up) elicited more regret than inactions (e.g., staying in a relationship). However, when blame for relationship failure is attributed to one’s partner, participants reported equal regret for actions or inactions. More specific analyses showed that men and women both have more regret for actions when self-blame is involved but when other-blame is involved, women showed equal regret for actions and inactions whereas men trended toward more regret for inactions.
Keywords: regret, decision-making, thinking, gender