The current study aimed to uncover the structure of common latent processes underlying the execution of several tasks that hypothetically measure spontaneous and adaptive cognitive flexibility, providing evidence for their convergent validity. A group of healthy volunteers (N = 121) completed two sets of tasks to assess spontaneous and adaptive cognitive flexibility. Spontaneous flexibility measures included a divergent thinking test (to assess fluency and flexibility of thinking) and a verbal fluency test. Adaptive flexibility measures involved a set-switching test as a measure of switch costs and an attentional set-shifting test as a measure of learned irrelevance and perseveration). A vocabulary knowledge test provided a proxy measure of crystallized intelligence. Hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward's method revealed the existence of two separate subgroups of variables. The first group comprised fluency and flexibility of thinking, crystallized intelligence, verbal fluency, and switch costs. The second group included attentional shift variables, that is, learned irrelevance and perseveration. We consider these results meaningful and indicative of two separate factors contributing to cognitive flexibility: (a) speed of switching and (b) overcoming of prepotent responses. We discuss the implications of our results for the assessment of cognitive flexibility.

Romantic relationships can greatly enhance our lives, creating intimacy and bonding. Yet, not all relationships succeed, and when they fail, the resulting feelings can be intense, often leaving us feeling regret. The regret we feel is determined in part by whether we decide to take action or rely on inaction. Research shows that actions typically elicit more regret than inactions. However, research also shows gender differences for romantic regret, with men sometimes reporting more regret over inactions and women more regret over actions or equal regret for actions and inactions. The decision justification theory posits that regret is driven by two components: the event’s outcome and self-blame. In the current investigation, we manipulated self and other blame in a hypothetical romantic situation and showed that when blame is attributable to one’s self, actions (e.g., breaking up) elicited more regret than inactions (e.g., staying in a relationship). However, when blame for relationship failure is attributed to one’s partner, participants reported equal regret for actions or inactions. More specific analyses showed that men and women both have more regret for actions when self-blame is involved but when other-blame is involved, women showed equal regret for actions and inactions whereas men trended toward more regret for inactions.

Using a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion/prevention-focused) × 2 (decision-making strategies: intuitive/ rational strategies) experimental design, the current study explored the influence of regulatory focus and decision-making strategies on moral judgment. The results are as follows: (a) The main influencing effect of regulatory focus was statistically significant. Specifically, participants that were promotion-focused tended to make utilitarian moral judgments while participants that were prevention-focused tended to make deontological moral judgments. (b) The interaction effect of regulatory focus and decision-making strategies was also statistically significant. Specifically, moral judgement scores from participants that were promotion-focused were higher when they adopted intuitive rather than rational strategies while the scores of participants that were prevention-focused were higher when they adopted rational rather than intuitive strategies. These results suggest that the fit between regulatory focus and decision-making strategies can influence moral judgment.