Within recent years, researchers have proposed the independence of attention and consciousness on both empirical and conceptual grounds. However, the elusive nature of these constructs complicates progress in the investigation of their interaction. We present a framework within which we conceptualize attention and consciousness in computational terms. Here, the concepts are considered as large-scale, functionally and structurally different processes, embedded in a biologically inspired architecture, spanning the full arc from stimulus to response. Our architecture assumes a general independence of attention and consciousness, but supposes strong interactions. Furthermore, it addresses the developmental aspect, stressing that these functions have to gradually develop through learning.

The implementation or change of information processing routines, known as cognitive control, is traditionally believed to be closely linked to consciousness. It seems that we exert control over our behavior if we know the reasons for, and consequences of, doing so. Recent research suggests, however, that several behavioral phenomena that have been construed as instances of cognitive control can be prompted by events of which actors are not aware. Here we give a brief review of this research, discuss possible reasons for inconsistencies in the empirical evidence, and suggest some lines of future research. Specifically, we suggest to differentiate cognitive control evoked either because of explicit or because of implicit control cues. While the former type of control seems to work outside of awareness, the latter type of control seems to be restricted to consciously registered events that call for control.

A most sensitive and specific electrophysiological indicator of selective processing of visual stimuli is the N2pc component. N2pc is a negative EEG potential peaking 250 ms after stimulus onset, recorded from posterior sites contralateral to relevant stimuli. Additional deflections preceding or following N2pc have been obtained in previous studies, possibly produced by specific stimulus features or specific prime-target sequences. To clarify the entire time-course of the contralateral- ipsilateral (C-I) difference recorded from the scalp above visual cortex in response to left-right pairs of targets and distracters, C-I differences were here compared between two types of stimuli and between stimuli that were or were not preceded by masked neutral primes. The C-I difference waveform consisted of several peaks, termed here P1pc (60-100 ms after target onset), N1pc (120-160 ms), N2pc (220-280 ms), and N3pc (360-400 ms). Being markedly enhanced when stimuli were preceded by the neutral primes, P1pc may indicate a response to stimulus change. Also, when stimuli were primed, N2pc reached its peak earlier, thereby tending to merge with N1pc. N3pc seemed to increase when target discrimination was difficult. N1pc, N2pc, and N3pc appear as three periods of one process. N3pc probably corresponds to L400 or SPCN as described in other studies. These observations suggest that the neurophysiological basis of stimulus-driven focusing of attention on target stimuli is a process that lasts for hundreds of milliseconds, with the relevant hemisphere being activated in an oscillating manner as long as required by the task.

Lesions of occipital cortex result in loss of sight in the corresponding regions of visual fields. The traditional view that, apart from some spontaneous recovery in the acute phase, field defects remain permanently and irreversibly blind, has been challenged. In patients with partial field loss, a range of residual visual abilities in the absence of conscious perception (blindsight) has been demonstrated (Weiskrantz, 1986). Recent findings (Sahraie et al., 2006, 2010) have also demonstrated increased visual sensitivity in the field defect following repeated stimulation. We aimed to extend these findings by systematically exploring whether repeated stimulation can also lead to increased visual sensitivity in two cases with total (bilateral) cortical blindness. In addition, for a case of partial blindness, we examined the extent of the recovery as a function of stimulated region of the visual field, over extended periods of visual training. Positive auditory feedback was provided during the training task for correct detection of a spatial grating pattern presented at specific retinotopic locations using a temporal two alternative forced-choice paradigm (Neuro-Eye Therapy). All three cases showed improved visual sensitivity with repeated stimulation. The findings indicate that perceptual learning can occur through systematic visual field stimulation even in cases of bilateral cortical blindness.

Even at subclinical levels, anxiety and depression are associated with impaired cognitive control. It is unclear, though, to what extent these deficits reflect a common underlying dysfunction. Using a non-affective hybrid masked prime-Simon task, we obtained several measures of within- and between-trial inhibitory behavioral control in 80 young, healthy volunteers, together with measures of their anxiety and depression levels. Neither depression nor anxiety affected low-level within-trial control, or any of the between-trial control measures. However, increased levels of depression, but not of anxiety, were associated with impaired high-level within-trial control (increased Simon effect). Results indicate that depression, but not anxiety, impairs voluntary online response-control mechanisms independent of affective content.

Classical theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes elicited by unconscious stimuli are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. In contrast to these classical conceptions, we argue that automatic processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways and propose an attentional sensitization model of unconscious visual processing: According to this model, unconscious visual processing is automatic in the sense that it is initiated without deliberate intention. However, unconscious visual processing is susceptible to attentional top-down control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. In this article, we describe our attentional sensitization model and review recent evidence demonstrating attentional influences on subliminal priming, a prototypical example of an automatic process. We show that subliminal priming (a) depends on attentional resources, (b) is susceptible to stimulus expectations, (c) is influenced by action intentions, and (d) is modulated by task sets. These data suggest that attention enhances or attenuates unconscious visual processes in congruency with attentional task representations similar to conscious perception. We argue that seemingly paradoxical, hitherto unexplained findings regarding the automaticity of the underlying processes in many cognitive domains can be easily accommodated by our attentional sensitization model. We conclude this review with a discussion of future research questions regarding the nature of attentional control of unconscious visual processing.

The inhibitory effect of the processing of target-like distracters has already been shown to affect the conscious detection of simple motion and simple orientation stimuli in a random dot kinematogram. In two experiments we examined the effects of single-feature motion distracters, single-feature orientation distracters, and combined-feature distracters containing both motion and orientation information. The target was specified as a coherent motion episode (Experiment 1) or as a combined-feature episode where the coherent motion was accompanied by an abrupt change in line orientation (Experiment 2). Results showed that (a) the respective feature-specific inhibitory processes operate separately even when the distracter features are presented simultaneously and (b) both inhibitory processes contribute to the blindness effect when the conjunction of two features is defined as the target. Again, this inhibitory-process is feature-specific: Only features that are defined in the task are represented in the inhibitory task set. In case of combined-feature task-sets, these representations remain separate, so that combined-feature distracters as well as single-feature distracters are able to induce blindness effects.